Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Introduction
Traditional neoclassical models of migration posit that narrowing wage gaps between country pairs monotonically reduce migration along speci…c corridors. In reality we rather observe an inverted-U, cross-sectional relationship between migration and development. This is perhaps best known as the mobility transition curve following the seminal work of Zelinsky (1971) . Contrary to the neoclassical tradition therefore, economic development likely spurs additional emigration from origin countries in early stages of development (see de Haas, 2007 de Haas, , 2010a de Haas, , 2010b ) as shown in Figure 1 .a. 1 Adults' emigration rates increase with economic development until an income per capita of around $6,000 and decrease thereafter. Figure  1 .b shows the density of the world population by income level, disregarding within-country inequality. Approximately two thirds of the world population reside in countries characterized by incomes per capita of less than $6,000. Taken at face value, the mobility transition curve suggests that further global economic development should result in higher volumes of international migration from the poorest regions of the world. It is no surprise therefore that co-development policies based on neoclassical suppositions have largely proven unsuccessful (see Clemens, 2014; Parsons and Winters, 2014) . While various explanations of the observed relationship have been conjectured in speci…c contexts, they have not been examined in a systematic way, such that we remain naive with regards the underlying mechanisms at play as well as the potential consequences of a change in the world distribution of income. 2 In this paper, we develop a novel migration accounting methodology to evaluate the competing theorems that are hypothesized to underpin the upward segment of the observed relationship, so as to provide an answer to the decades-old puzzle. Our methodology consists in (i) parameterizing a migration model using detailed cross-sectional data on skill-speci…c aspirations to emigrate and success rates, and then (ii) use counterfactual experiments to identify the root drivers of the mobility transition curve and quantify their role. A similar approach is used in the development accounting literature (see Jones, 2015) . We proceed in three steps. We …rst decompose average emigration rates, distinguishing between bilateral migration aspirations and realization rates and between college-educated and less educated individuals; in order to provide a non-parametric analysis of the underlying data. Second, we run regressions to disentangle and quantify various potential drivers of aspirations and realization rates at the bilateral level. Third, we counterfactually simulate the capacity of each set of drivers to account for cross-country variations in emigration rates; speci…cally focusing on factors responsible for the increasing segment of mobility transition. 1 Net emigration rates are proxied by the changes in emigration stocks between 2000 and 2010 as a percentage of the resident population in 2000. Note that we also …nd the same inverted-U shape pattern of emigration rates when emigration rates are weighted with the relative size of each country in the global population. 2 As argued by Clemens (2014) , "We do not know enough about the mechanisms that create this observed pattern. Theories of the transition are well-developed, though they could bene…t from more formalization and uni…cation in a single framework that can explain patterns observed at both the macro-and micro-levels". Notes: Non-parametric regressions using Epanechnikov kernel (see Epanechnikov, 1969) , local-mean smoothing, bandwidth 0.5. Our sample includes 123 countries with populations above 2.5 million. We omit small states that typically exhibit unusually large emigration rates as well as countries in war. Average migration rates are calculated as the di¤erence between migrant stocks in 2000 and 2010 (we omit negative net ‡ows), normalized by the population at origin. The migration data derive from the OECD-DIOC database. Our paper contributes to a 45 year-old literature on the link between development and emigration. Wilbur Zelinsky in his classic paper (Zelinsky, 1971) , developed the theory of the mobility transition. This descriptive theory, combining insights from modernization theory and demographic transition analysis, hypothesizes that societies pass through …ve distinct phases of development, from pre-modern traditional societies to future super-advanced societies, which are accompanied by various forms of internal and international migration patterns. The theory predicts an inverted-U shape between average emigrate rates and levels of income per capita. This relationship, which we term the mobility transition curve, has since been empirically established in speci…c contexts and variously referred to as: migration curve (Akerman, 1976) ), migration transition (Gould, 1979) , migration hump (Martin, 1993) , and emigration life cycle (Hatton and Williamson, 1994) . The mobility transition curve has perhaps most recently been con…rmed as a cross-country relationship. Using aggregate stock data for the years 1960 to 2000, Clemens (2014) shows that emigration increases with economic development at origin until a level of development commensurate with a per capita income of around $5,000 in PPP terms, while falling thereafter. 3;4 The observed inverted-U relationship between emigration and development is not predicted by neoclassical models of migration, which, building upon Sjaastad (1962) , place wage or income di¤erentials at the heart of rational agents'decision as to whether to remain at home or migrate elsewhere, thereby predicting that narrowing income di¤erentials between origins and destinations will (monotonically) reduce the intensity of international migration. In the neoclassical tradition however, the interplay between emigration incentives and constraints, what we term microeconomic drivers, may give rise to the mobility transition curve. Increases in personal income make migration more a¤ordable while simultaneously reducing individual's willingness to migrate. The existence of credit constraints can therefore explain the paradox whereby emigration is limited from low-income regions in which many citizens would bene…t the most from emigrating to higher-income regions. Along a similar line of argument, de Haas (2010b) proposes to incorporate the notions of agency and individual aspirations into transition theory, by conceptualizing migration at the microeconomic level as a function of aspirations (as characterized by an inverted-U shaped relationship) and capabilities (that increase monotonically with development). There is ample historical evidence on the role of liquidity constraints in the 18th and 19th centuries (Hatton and Williamson, 1994; Hatton and Williamson, 1998; Faini and Venturini, 2010; Covarrubias et al., 2015) . More recently, using administrative data from Indonesia, Bazzi (2013) provides evidence that …nancial constraints limit international labor mobility, such that positive agricultural income shocks result in signi…cant increases in international migration, particularly among villages with higher numbers of small landholders. Both mechanisms, emigration incentives and constraints (or aspirations and capabilities), are captured by income and are therefore di¢ cult to distinguish.
Aside from microeconomic drivers, economists and geographers have, for almost half a century, pro¤ered a number of complementary theories aimed at explaining the observed re-lationship between emigration and economic development. A recent survey (Clemens, 2014) , lists …ve alternative classes of theory. (i) Demographic transitions for example may result in more youthful and economically-active populations, which might result in more emigration should they fail to be absorbed locally into the labour force (see Lee, 2003) . (ii) Immigration barriers abroad, for example visas, are typically lower for citizens of wealthier nations and for high-skilled workers, meaning that they are more migratory than their lower-skilled compatriots. Education may stimulate migration aspirations of potential migrants, while selective immigration policies at destination favor educated migrants. The impact of development on the skill composition of migration remains ambiguous however. At early stages of development, improvements in education provision likely increase the success rate of potential migrants. Since education quality is endogenous with economic development however, further educational improvements likely reduce potential migrants'willingness to move, an e¤ect which is likely compounded by the narrowing educational gaps between origins and potential destinations. (iii) Within-country income inequality since during initial stages of development that are characterized by rising inequality, worse-o¤ individuals feel relatively deprived and seek other 'reference'frames. (iv) Structural transformation due to for example trade linkages that emerge concurrently with the formation of transportation and communication networks that may facilitate mobility (see Massey et al., 1993; Martin and Taylor, 1996; Faini and Venturini, 2010) . (v) Information asymmetry whereby migrants for example, having settled, may provide information and send remittances to potential migrants thereby reducing migration costs (see Beine et al., 2010 and .
Another plausible theoretical underpinning is provided by the role of 'gravity' or geographic variables on economic development and migration costs, which have been understudied in the literature in this context. Potential migrants from remote countries located near the tropics face greater migration costs in terms of greater geographic, linguistic and cultural distances, such that emigration is bounded by both …nancial and geographical constraints. The closer such countries are to major migrant-receiving nations (which are usually located in the farther ends of the two hemispheres), the higher their income levels and the lower the costs of migration. Thus absolute geography may explain why emigration rates and economic development are positively correlated, without implying a causal e¤ect of development on emigration. Importantly, the roles of both geography and culture, which jointly a¤ect both migration costs and economic development (see Gallup et al., 1999) , need to be accounted for.
This paper quanti…es the competing mechanisms that underpin the mobility transition for the …rst time. We dissect the anatomy of the mobility transition by simultaneously incorporating all relevant aggregate and microeconomic mechanisms into our empirical model. Distinguishing between skill groups proves key, since many of the underlying mechanisms a¤ect individuals of various educational attainments di¤erently. 5 Our migration accounting exercise reveals that microeconomic drivers (i.e. private incentives and migration constraints) while relevant, only have a limited e¤ect on the aggregate. Overall, the contribution of microeconomic drivers accounts for around 25% of the slope of the increasing segment of the mobility transition curve in low-income countries and for less than 20% in lower-middleincome countries. More starkly, between one-third and one-half of the rise in emigration in poor countries is due to the changing skill composition of working-age populations at origin, and another third is due to changing network size. The implications of our …ndings therefore are that going into the future emigrants will likely be more educated. If rather liquidity constraints were most binding rises in development would rather be associated with increases in low-skilled migration. Finally, our analysis also sheds light on the microfoundations of migration decisions. It suggests that aspiration patterns are compatible with a model of relative deprivation, according to which decisions are based on the relative position of an individual in a social hierarchy, as opposed to the absolute level of their income. Conversely, realization rates are not only a¤ected by migration policies but also depend upon the opportunity costs of preparing for migration.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and provides aggregate stylized facts on various components of the mobility transition. In Section 3, we estimate the determinants of (bilateral) migration aspirations and realization rates by education level. Section 4 uses counterfactual experiments to quantify the relative contribution of the various underlying mechanisms and identi…es the residual e¤ect of microeconomic drivers. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude.
Data and Stylized facts
To disentangle the various potential drivers of the mobility transition curve (as detailed in the previous section), we construct measures of migration intensity, by education level, over the 2000-2010 period. We further distinguish between actual and potential migration intensities. Actual migrants are those who have already left their country of origin. Potential migrants include those who live abroad (i.e. actual migrants) and those who have not yet migrated but express a desire to do so. We consider potential migration intensity as a proxy for migration aspirations. The ratio of actual to potential migration we term the realization or success rate. In this section we …rst describe the data sources used to compute our migration intensity measures before presenting some aggregate stylized facts. 6 We only consider migrants aged 25 and above (as a proxy for the working-age population) and distinguish between migrants with college education (denoted by h and referred to as the highly skilled) and other levels of education (denoted by l and referred to as the low-skilled). For each country pair, net migration ‡ows are proxied as the di¤erence between the bilateral migrant stocks in 2000 and 2010. We denote the net ‡ow of migrants from country i to country j of education level s = (h; l) as M s ij . Aggregating these numbers across OECD destinations allows us to characterize the size and structure of net emigration ‡ows to the OECD from all the countries of the world i.e. M s i = P j M s ij . To compute actual migration intensities, we divide our net migration ‡ows by the origin resident population in 2000. This requires data on the number and average education levels of working-age residents (proxied by the resident population aged 25 and above, which corresponds with our migration data) in each sending country in our sample. This variable, denoted by N s i , is taken from Artuç et al. (2015) , which proxies the size of the native population in country i from which we can extract the proportion of college educated ( l i ) and low-skilled ( l i 
Migration Data
Existing studies of the migration transition curve have characterized the cross-sectional relationship between m i and the development level of the origin country, proxied by its level of income per capita (y i ). Our decomposition by education level allows us to examine how the skill composition of the native population a¤ects the migration transition curve. In addition, distinguishing between actual and potential migrations lets us identify the e¤ect of economic development on migration aspirations and realization rates. We rely upon the Gallup World Poll surveys, which identify the proportion of non-migrants expressing a desire to emigrate to another country. The Gallup survey has been canvassing opinions annually in more than 150 countries since 2005. As well as documenting various individual characteristics (such as age, gender and education), these surveys also include two relevant questions on emigration intentions. These questions, posed in 142 countries, which represent about 97% of the world population, were: (i) Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move to another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country? (ii) To which country would you like to move? In line with actual migration and population data, we only consider respondents aged 25 and above and distinguish between individuals with college education or otherwise. As in Docquier et al. (2014) and Docquier et al. (2015) , we aggregate four waves of the Gallup survey (i.e. the years 2007 to 2010) and consider that these four waves represent a single period of observation. Although the use of contingent valuation surveys to assess migration preferences is open to criticisms (see Clemens and Pritchett, 2016) , there are reasons to believe that the Gallup surveys are a unique and relevant source of information about migration aspirations. First, Gallup is the most comprehensive source of data on Furthermore, any panel study would need to account for the endogeneity between acquiring education and the prospect of migration, what is known as the brain gain e¤ect. migration aspirations worldwide or at the global scale. Second, empirical studies reveal that the reported aspirations are nicely correlated with the traditional divers of migration (Dustman and Okatenko, 2014; Docquier et al., 2014; Manchin et al., 2014, etc.) . Third, there is a high correlation between migration aspirations at year t and actual migration ‡ows at year t + 1 (Bertoli and Ruyssen, 2016), although the size of actual ‡ows is smaller.
Adding desiring migrants to actual migration ‡ows, we de…ne the concept of potential migration ‡ows P s ij , i.e. the total migration ‡ows that would have been observed between 2000 and 2010 if all desiring migrants had been able or allowed to emigrate. Aggregating bilateral stocks give P Our decomposition of emigration rates by skill level, allows us to investigate whether the e¤ect of economic development on emigration is skill speci…c and whether it is driven by migration aspirations or else by realization rates.
Stylized Facts
In this section, we provide stylized facts based upon overall migration rates, disaggregated by skill level, which elucidate the need for more detailed migration data to explain the existence of the mobility transition, when moving beyond traditional neoclassical explanations. We examine the relationship between aggregate migration rates and economic development as measured by the level of income per capita (y i ). The databases described above allow us to identify skill di¤erences in emigration rates and distinguish between migration aspirations and realization rates. The average emigration rate of country i (i = 1; :::; I) can be decomposed as:
where p s i is the proportion of potential migrants and r s i is the average realization rate. The product of these two variables give the proportion of natives who have already realized their migration aspirations. This corresponds to the observed migration rates by skill groups. Figure 2 shows the relationship between each component m s (y), p s (y), r s (y) and s (y), and the level of GDP per capita in US dollars. We consider a sample of 123 countries, excluding small states with populations lower than 2.5 million inhabitants as well as those experiencing episodes of con ‡ict. The results are estimated using the non-parametric Epanechnikov kernel density estimation (see Epanechnikov, 1969) . The skill compositions of populations vary with economic development.
Education levels, taken in isolation, likely prove crucial in understanding the foundations of the mobility transition curve since the hypothesized drivers underpinning the relationship likely a¤ect individuals of various educational attainments di¤erently. Taking the derivative of the average migration rate in (1) with respect to income per capita, we have:
As shown in …gure 2.a., the share of high-skilled in the population h rises constantly with development, which is greater by a factor of more than 20 in rich, as when compared with the poorest countries. In addition, the average migration rates m s are always greater among college graduates than among the less educated, as depicted in …gure 2.b. At low levels of income per capita, positive selection is strong (m h ' 30m l ). In the richest countries, positive selection is much weaker (m h ' 3m l ). Overall, the emigration rates of the college-educated m h decrease with development, while those of the less-educated m l are inverted-U shaped. The …rst term in the derivative above is always positive therefore. If poor countries were counterfactually endowed with the same share of college graduates as in the richest countries, they would therefore exhibit very large emigration rates other factors held constant. Note that an increasing segment of the mobility transition curve would be observed when the e¤ect of the …rst term dominates, even if the emigration rates of each skill group decreased with development, i.e. dm s =dy are jointly negative. The observed emigration rates are the products of migration aspirations and realization rates. Figure 2 .c. shows that migration aspirations decrease with development for both college-educated and less educated individuals. 7 We observe a positive selection in migration aspirations, but this selection is much weaker when compared to actual migration. At low levels of development, the average willingness to migrate among the highly-educated is greater by a factor of four (when compared to the lower-skilled) p h ' 4p l . In the richest countries, the ratio falls to one and a half p h ' 1:5p l . Figure 2 .d. describes the relationship between income per capita and the realization rates of college graduates r h i and the less-educated r l i . Overall, the realization rate of the highskilled slightly decreases with development. Its slope is not as sharp as that of the p h curve. The realization rate of the less educated however, is the only inverted-U shaped component of the decomposition equation (1) . At low levels of income per capita, the high-skilled are eight times more likely to realize their migration aspirations compared to the low-skilled r h ' 8r l . This ratio falls to 2 at intermediate income levels (around US $5,000) and reaches 3 in the richest countries. 
Empirical Analysis
The stylized facts described in the previous section reveal that average aspiration and realization rates of both high and low-skilled individuals are strongly correlated with the level of economic development of origin countries. Importantly, the only inverted-U shaped component is the realization rate of the low-skilled. In this section, we implement regressions to explore the relationship between emigration intensity and development. Given our foregoing discussions, our aim is to estimate (and subsequently quantify) the relative contributions of all the factors that the literature has highlighted as being potential explanations of the mobility transition including: microeconomic drivers, socio-demographic variables, and the in ‡uence of gravity and networks. Importantly, we evaluate the impact of all these variables on both high-skilled and low-skilled emigration rates. Identifying the in ‡uence of gravity drivers requires our analysis to be conducted at the bilateral level, as well as controlling for absolute geography, culture and other exogenous determinants of migration ‡ows. Hence, building upon (2), the average emigration rate of country i (i = 1; :::; I) can be decomposed as following:
Our empirical analysis distinguishes between four dependent variables, namely the bilateral migration aspirations and realization rates of both college-educated and less educated adults, p s ij and r s ij (s = h; l). The set of explanatory variables includes the following variables:
Gravity drivers (denoted by G ij ) includes the log of geographic distance between sending and receiving countries and a set of dummy variables that equal one should the sending and receiving countries by contiguous, speak a common language or share a colonial heritage after 1945. These variables are obtained from the CEPII Dyadic Distance Database described in Mayer and Zignago (2011) . We also include a measure of genetic diversity as a proxy for cultural distance; we use the probability that two alleles (a particular form taken by a gene) at a given locus selected at random from two populations are di¤erent (proxy for time since isolation) from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). Genetic distance is based on blood sample and proxies the time since two populations had common ancestors. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015) …nd a pattern of positive and signi…cant relationships between genetic distance and various measures of cultural distance, including language, religion, values, and norms. Finally, we control for population size.
To account for pre-existing migrant networks (denoted by S ij ), we use the total stock of bilateral migrants from i to j in the year 2000, divided by the native population of country i in the same year. This variable captures the probability that a native from country i has a friend or relative in country j at the beginning of the period.
Socio-demographic drivers (denoted by A i ) include: the share of the population in country i aged between 15 and 24 in 2000 as a proxy for the adult population in the age of migration between 2000 and 2010, average weighted import tari¤s, as proxies for the degree of openness of country i and an index of education quality. The shares of the population aged 15-24 are obtained from the UN-DESA World Population Prospects 2012. Information on weighted import tari¤s comes from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) as of the year 2000. This variable is constructed using the average of all e¤ectively applied import tari¤s weighted by their corresponding trade value. 8 The lower the import tari¤s, the more open a country. Data on education quality are proxied by the test score results of high school students in maths, science and reading skills, which are taken from Angrist et al. (2013) .
Having controlled for gravity, network and socio-demographic channels (i.e. all the relevant, origin-speci…c mechanisms identi…ed in the existing literature), we further consider the residual e¤ects of income and inequality (denoted by y i and ! i ). This residual e¤ect reasonably gives an upper-bound for the e¤ect of microeconomic drivers.
We construct proxies for skill-speci…c levels of income, y h i and y l i and include their logged levels and their squares. Our measures of income proxy for income inequality. We use GDP per capita data at destination (PPP in 2005) international USD (Chain series) in 2000 (y i ) from the Penn World Tables 7.0 and data on the wage ratio between college educated and less educated workers (! i ) from Hendricks (2004) . We combine these values with the proportions of high-skilled and low-skilled workers from Artuç et al. (2015) . Skill-speci…c income levels are computed as
Finally, each regression includes a full set of destination …xed e¤ects. These capture the relative attractiveness of all destinations as well as accounting for immigration policies that do not discriminate between origins. Figure 3 depicts the cross-sectional relationships between the main potential drivers of emigration rates and the level of income per capita in the origin country. These relationships are estimated using the non-parametric Epanechnikov kernel density estimation (see Epanechnikov, 1969 ). On average, population size is poorly correlated with development (…g. 3.a). On the contrary, the share of the population aged 15 to 24 (…g. 3.b), the average geographic distance from the nearest OECD country (…g. 3.c), and the level of income inequality in the origin country (…g. 3.f) are negatively correlated with income per capita. As far as the network size (…g. 3.d) is concerned, it …rst increases with development before decreasing when income per capita exceeds $7,000. Finally, education quality (…g. 3.e) is positively correlated with development. 
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To estimate potential bilateral emigration rates p s ij we use the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator (PPML) described in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006 and 2011), for three reasons. First, the variance of the error in gravity equations, which is non-linear, varies across country-pairs such that the OLS estimator may be biased due to heteroskedasticity. Second, the PPML estimator is consistent in the presence of …xed e¤ects. Third, the potential bilateral rate variables p s ij contain a large proportion of zero values (7.25% for college graduates and 8.8% for the less educated) due to the absence of migrants between many country-pairs. The PPML estimator does not exclude these zeroes and thus eliminates sample selection bias.
Our measures of realization rates r s ij , contain high proportions of both zeroes and ones. The cause of zero realization rates is the same as for actual migration rates. Values of one, which are equivalent to a one hundred percent probability of realizing migration, are due to the total absence of individuals expressing a desire to emigrate in the Gallup World Poll and having not yet emigrated between 2000-2010. Realization rates of 0 and 1 among the lessand college-educated account for 3.85 and 9.52% of the total migration of their skill groups respectively and 2.3 and 3.9% of the total migration stock. The presence of these zeroes and ones may lead to our results being inconsistent since our estimations may be biased towards smaller and less important corridors that account for a large number of observations in our sample. We decide to drop these observations and rely upon OLS.
The speci…cations of our potential and realization equations are:
where p s ij in equation (3) is the potential bilateral migration rate and r s ij the realization rate. Both are regressed on the same set of explanatory variables: gravity drivers G ij , migrant networks S ij , socio-demographic determinants A i , skill-speci…c logarithmic wages y s i , destination country …xed e¤ects s j and s j . The exp(:) speci…cation in (4) is due to the use of the PPML estimator.
The (gravity) regressions that we estimate below, although not formally derived from an underlying random utility model, nevertheless manifest similarly. One particular concern in this regard is the potential role of multilateral resistance to migration (MRM) -see Bertoli and Fernandez-Huertas Moraga (2013), which is the observation that the attractiveness of a particular destination country for potential migrants at origin will likely depend upon the relative attractiveness of alternative destinations. To account for any potential bias that might arise from the existence of MRM, we follow the approach of Baier and Bergstrand (2009), one adapted to the case of migration as in Gröschl (2012) and control for MRM with the inclusion of two additional terms in Eqs. (4) and (5) . These terms capture the average distance and contiguity of country i and j with respect to all other migration partners.
Regression results for migration aspiration and realization rates are presented in Tables  1 and 2 . All estimations include both destination …xed e¤ects and variables controlling for multilateral resistance to migration. The standard errors are clustered by country of origin. Columns (L1) and (H1) include the full set of controls and the log of the skill-speci…c level of income (linear speci…cation). Columns (L2) and (H2) add the squared level of income (quadratic speci…cation). Finally, columns (L3) and (H3) represent our parsimonious speci…cations comprising signi…cant controls only, in addition to the log level of income. The parsimonious speci…cations are obtained after running backward stepwise regressions starting from the most complete model. Decision to include a variable is based on its p-value, i.e. the variable should be signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at 5% threshold, and on the global …t of the model before and after eliminating that variable. The correlations between income, income squared, gravity and socio-demographic determinants prove important and in our subsequent counterfactual simulations, we use the estimates of the parsimonious regressions to minimize collinearity problems.
Focusing …rst upon migration aspirations, Table 1 reveals that the e¤ect of skill-speci…c income level is only signi…cant for the less-educated; it is insigni…cant for college graduates. When both the linear and squared income terms are included, in model (L2), the low-skill wage loses its signi…cance. This suggests that migration aspirations of the less educated are linearly decreasing with income. In accordance with …gure 2.c, we …nd no evidence that migration aspirations increase with income in early stages of development. The presence of a network abroad as a huge e¤ect on migration aspirations, especially for the less educated. Among the socio-demographic drivers, the share of population aged between 15 and 24 has a signi…cant e¤ect, but only for the highly skilled. Education quality has no signi…cant impact. This variable only re ‡ects the cognitive abilities of high-school students and so it plausibly has little in ‡uence on global attitudes towards migration. Higher average import tari¤s, which correspond to lower degrees of openness, do not a¤ect migration aspirations. The coe¢ cients on the gravity variables exhibit the expected signs. Geographic distance reduces migration aspirations while common language and colonial links increase them. The e¤ect of contiguity is negative in both skill groups; this counter-intuitive result could be interpreted as a border e¤ect when geographic distance is small. Genetic distance has no signi…cant e¤ect on the desire to emigrate. The results on population size are negative for the low-skilled, which might be indicative of the fact that larger countries usually exhibit lower (international) migration rates since their citizens have access to wider ranges of job opportunities at home. Our results do show that countries populated by relatively young and educated citizens experience higher average willingness to emigrate however.
The determinants of realization rates are presented in Table 2 . Interestingly, both the linear and squared terms of the low-skill wage variable are now highly signi…cant, suggesting that the relationship between realizing migration and …nancial capacity is non-linear. In line with Clemens (2014), realization rates tend to increase at low income levels and reach a maximum when wages are around $5,027, decreasing thereafter. This suggests that economic progress increases the capacity of the less educated to …nancially meet the cost of international movement during early stages of development. For the college-educated, we do not identify a similar non-linear pattern; the e¤ect of income is monotonic and signi…cantly negative. This suggests that instead of being …nancially constrained, the college-graduates face higher opportunity cost with migration when income rises at home. Financial hurdles are partially captured by geographic distance however, which has negative e¤ect on realization rates. The closer an origin to a major OECD destination, the more potential migrants realize their aspirations. Geographic distance represents both …nancial and psychic costs of being far from family and friends however. Sharing colonial ties or a common language increases realization rates, but these variables only remain statistically signi…cant for the college-educated. Overall, the gravity channels however play an important role in determining both the willingness and realization of migration. Migrant networks mitigate these costs related to long-distance movement and have sizable e¤ects on the success of migration; contrary to aspirations, the magnitude of network e¤ects is globally similar across skill groups. Socio-demographic factors do not have any impact upon realization rates, except for the positive e¤ect of education quality on the realization rates of the low-skilled.
Dissecting the Anatomy of the Mobility Transition
In this section, we quantify the relative contributions of those factors that have been documented in the literature as providing potential foundations for the mobility transition curve. In line with the development accounting literature (Jones, 2015) , we use counterfactual simulations to assess the capacity of each set of drivers to account for cross-country variations in emigration rates. More precisely, we compute counterfactual emigration rates and compare their trend with that observed. Our counterfactuals are emigration rates that would be obtained should one set of explanatory variables at the time be equal to the average level observed in the richest countries of the world (all countries in our sample with income per capita above $25,000). 9 Given the bilateral decomposition of observed emigration rates used in our empirics, we can generalize (3) and write:
If a set X = f ; G; S; A; !; yg of determinants is set to the average level observed in the richest countries ( b X), the variations in potential emigration rates, ln p s ij = s X ( b X X i ), and in realization rates, r s ij = s X ( b X X i ), can be computed for each pair of countries using the estimated coe¢ cients ( s X ; s X ) from (4) and (5) . In these simulations, we only consider those coe¢ cients that are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 95% con…dence level in our parsimonious speci…cations (i.e. columns L3 and H3 in Tables 1 and 2). We then use (6) to aggregate the new aspirations and realization rates to compute counterfactual emigration rates, migration aspirations and realization rates for the whole population and particular skill groups. 
Tab 1. Determinants of migration aspirations (PPML regressions)

OLS). All regressions include Destination Fixed E¤ects and variables to control for Multilateral
Resistance to Migration. The full sample consists of 4125 observations that correspond to bilateral migration between 123 origins and 33 destinations. The less-and high-educated migration realization variables contain, respectively, 951 and 883 missing values, 106 and 73 values of zero, 1,560 and 2,041 values of one, thus 1,409 and 1,067 observations remain. Standard errors are clustered by country of origin.
Drivers of the Mobility Transition Curve
Our main variable of interest is the average emigration rate. As seven drivers prove significant in our regressions, we conduct eight counterfactual experiments. The …rst consists of weighting skill-speci…c average emigration rates by the average proportions of college graduates and less educated workers in the labor force of the richest countries (b s instead of s i ). Our second replaces the distance matrices (G ij ) by the average distance between the richest countries and each destination ( b G j ). 10 Similarly, our third counterfactual replaces the bilateral network sizes (S ij ) by the average stock of emigrants from the richest countries to each destination j ( b S j ). The fourth and …fth counterfactuals replace the share of population aged 15-24 ( b A 1j ) and the education quality ( b A 2j ) by the average levels observed in the richest countries, respectively. In the sixth counterfactual, we assess the impact of inequality, by replacing the skill-speci…c income levels by those obtained if the wage ratio was equivalent to the average ratio in the richest countries (keeping income per capita at its observed level,
For the seventh counterfactual, we implement the average level of income per capita observed in the richest countries (keeping the wage ratio at its observed level,
The …nal experiment consists on replacing all signi…cant drivers jointly. In the latter case, the counterfactual emigration rate b m all;i is not exactly equal to the average rate observed in the richest countries. The reason is that our parsimonious regressions explains around 50% of the variability in aspirations, and around 30% of the variability in realization rates. However the di¤erence between b m all;i and the emigration rate of the richest countries is small. We obtain eight counterfactual vectors of emigration rates labeled as b m X;i henceforth and de…ned as: 
For each counterfactual vector of emigration rates, we estimate the nonparametric trend b m X (y) using the Epanechnikov kernel method with a bandwidth of 0.5 and compare it with the inverted-U shaped curve computed for the observed emigration rates, b m(y). Deviations in levels and variations can be expressed as:
The results of the decompositions of average emigration rates are depicted in Figure  4 . Figure 4 .a illustrates the relationship between the counterfactual emigration rates and the level of income per capita, i.e. b m X (y). In Figure 4 .b, the level of X (y) shows how each driver X a¤ects the emigration rates for any level of economic development. The magnitude of X (y) is determined by the e¤ect of X on aspirations and realization rates, as well as by the correlation between economic development and the determinants depicted on Figure 3 , i.e. X(y). If X (y) > 0; it means that, compared to the average level of the richest countries ( b X), the level of X(y) tends to increase the emigration rates at the level of development y; equivalently, transposing the characteristics of the richest countries would decrease the emigration rate. If X (y) < 0; the level of X(y) tends to decrease emigration rates; equivalently, transposing the characteristics of the richest countries would increase emigration. In Figure 4 .c, the sign and level of X (y), the slope of X (y), tells us whether a marginal increase in economic development stimulates or reduces emigration rates through X(y). We are particularly interested in identifying the drivers that explain the positive slope of the mobility transition curve at low level of development.
In Table 3 , we report the values of X (y) and X (y) (multiplied by 100) for …ve benchmark levels of income, $1,000 (which approximately corresponds to the income threshold de…ning low-income countries), $1,600 (which corresponds to the peak of the X (y) curve), $4,000 (which approximately corresponds to the income threshold de…ning lower-middleincome countries), $6,000 (which corresponds to the peak of the mobility transition curve), and $12,000 (which approximately corresponds to the income threshold de…ning high-income countries). As our model is highly nonlinear, summing the e¤ects of each drivers taken in isolation does not match the e¤ect of the joint counterfactual all (y). The residual row informs us about the magnitude of the interactions (complementarity or substitution) between drivers.
In Figure 4 .a, it appears that relatively small (albeit intuitive and non negligible) changes in emigration rates are obtained when transposing the wage inequality, the education quality, and the share of 15-24 observed in the richest countries. In the same vein, gravity drivers have a limited impact on emigration. On the contrary, counterfactual emigration rates are much greater when transposing the skill structure of industrialized countries, and much smaller when transposing their average income level. The e¤ect of the migrant network varies with development. At low level of development, transposing the average network size of industrialized countries has virtually no e¤ect en emigration; at intermediate levels of development, the same counterfactual reduces the emigration rate. Hence, quantitatively, the most important drivers of the mobility transition curve are the skill composition of the population, the size of the migrant network, and the microeconomic drivers. Figure 4 .b con…rms these results by depicting the di¤erences between the observed emigration rates and the counterfactual ones. One the one hand, the drivers X(y) that tend to decrease emigration (i.e. those for which X (y) < 0) are the skill composition of the working-age population and, to a much lesser extent, education quality and gravity variables. On the other hand, the drivers X(y) that tend to increase emigration (i.e. those for which X (y) > 0) are the average level of income, the network e¤ects (mainly for intermediate income levels) and, to a much lesser extent, the age structure of the population. The e¤ect of income inequality is negligible. In Table 3 , it clearly appears that the contribution 20 of the education channel exceeds that of the income and network channels in low-income countries. For example, when income per capita is equal to $1,600, the smallness of the share of college graduates decreases the emigration rate by 2.69% compared to the richest countries, while the smallness of the income level increases emigration by 1.60%. At $4,000, the income e¤ect (+2.26%) dominates the skill composition e¤ect (-1.88%).
Clearly, the contribution of each driver varies with development and needs not operating monotonically. For example, income per capita ambiguously a¤ects the realization rates of the less educated (see Table 2 ), and the network size or the share of 15-24 vary non linearly with income (see Figure 3 ). Focusing on the slope of the mobility transition curve, X (y), Figure 4 .c disentangles the marginal impact of development on emigration by driver. It shows that all derivatives are positive (or are very small below $4,000). This is con…rmed by Table  3 : in the …rst three columns related to X (y), all contributions are positive or negligible, except for the residual channel (which attenuates the sum of all e¤ects). This implies that each channel taken in isolation contributes to increasing emigration in low-income and lowermiddle-income countries. However the relative importance of the key drivers varies with economic development:
At low levels of development (income per capita around $1,000), most of the e¤ect is driven by the skill composition (32.2% of the sum, excluding the residual interaction term), followed by the network (29.3%) and the income channels (25.2%).
If income per capita is around $1,600, the slope of the migration curve peaks and the contribution of the skill composition is still dominant (31.0% of the sum, excluding the residual interaction term), followed by the network channel (30.4%) and by the income channel (21.5% of the total).
If income per capita is around $4,000, the income channel becomes small and negative (-7.6%). On the contrary, the skill composition channel is overwhelmingly dominant (54.4%), followed by the network e¤ect (30.4%).
As income per capita get closer to $6,000, the total slope becomes negative and some drivers operate with opposite signs.
Overall, the role of microeconomic drivers in shaping the mobility transition curve is non negligible but should not be overestimated. Given the high levels of selectivity observed in poor countries, about one third of the rise in emigration is due to the changing skill composition of the working-age population in low-income countries, and this contribution exceeds 50% in lower-middle-income countries. In other words, emigration increases with development, mainly because the proportion of college graduates in the native population increases and this group has the greatest propensity to emigrate by far. At low level of development, the contribution of microeconomic drivers (i.e. income and inequality e¤ects) is limited. They only explain 25% of the increasing segment in the poorest countries, and less than 20% in lower-middle-income countries. The remainder is explained by a changing combination of network, socio-demographic and gravity e¤ects. 
Analysis by Education Level
Counterfactual emigration rates can be calculated for college graduates and the less educated separately. In this section, we simulate counterfactual emigration rates m s X;i for each group of workers (s = h; l) and for each country i, we estimate the nonparametric trends m s X (y) using the Epanechnikov kernel method. We compare these with the trends computed using observed values, m s (y). In the simulations, we only consider the coe¢ cients that are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 95% con…dence level in our parsimonious speci…cations (column H3 in Tables 1 and 2) . Obviously, the skill composition e¤ect is meaningless here as we focus on skill-speci…c responses. Figure 4 depicts the deviations in level, s X (y) and their slopes, s X (y). Figure 5 .a shows that the age structure of the population, the network size and the income level observed in developing countries tend to increase emigration of college-educated workers (these are the drivers X(y) such that h X (y) > 0). On the contrary, gravity drivers and the high level of within-country inequality tends to decrease high-skilled emigration rates (these are the drivers X(y) such that h X (y) < 0). In terms of magnitude, the age structure and the income channels are the most important. As far as income is concerned, the (microeconomic) e¤ects that prove central to neoclassical models of migration result from the comparison of the private costs and bene…ts from emigration. Overall, low levels of income in the poorest countries stimulate the emigration rate of college graduates. We …nd no evidence of binding migration constraints for the highly skilled. Indeed, although smaller in magnitude, the inequality e¤ect also leads to smaller high-skilled emigration rates in poor countries meaning that greater returns to schooling in poor countries (which slightly increase income of the highly skilled) reduce high-skilled emigration. At low levels of development (income per capita of $1,000), the observed emigration rate of the highly skilled is 15 percentage points greater than would otherwise prevail if individual income was equivalent to that observed in the richest countries. In Figure 5 .b, we observe that economic progress through the demographic and income channels. These are the most important channels. Their e¤ects are however attenuated by the network channel (below $5,000), by the gravity channel (above $2,000), and by the (smaller) inequality channel.
As for the less educated, most deviations in levels have the same sign as for the highly skilled. Figure 5 .c reveals that most channels result in higher emigration rates in developing countries ( l X (y) are positive), except for the gravity drivers and for education quality. The major di¤erence in comparison with college graduates is that these e¤ects are no longer monotonic, as shown in Figure 5 .d. At income levels below $4,000, a marginal increase in economic development stimulates the emigration of the less educated through all channels, especially through the network and income channels, which all turn negative above $4,000 to $5,000. This suggests that microeconomic drivers (including …nancial constraints) matter for the low-skilled. Migration constraints likely dominate the greater bene…ts from emigration at low levels of development. Notably distance decreases with development and restrains emigration from poor countries. As for the e¤ects of inequality, these are smaller than any e¤ect of income but play a similar role. At low levels of development, reducing inequality (i.e. increasing the wage rate of the poorest) would increase the emigration rate of the low-skilled. Our analysis by education level reveals that during early stages of development, migration constraints matter for the low-skilled but these can be attenuated by economic progress. These constraints may include credit constraints (the impossibility of …nancing emigration costs in poor countries) or institutional constraints (higher emigration costs in poor countries). These …ndings suggest that a micro-founded models of migration decisions need account for the existence of such constraints, but as demonstrated in Figure 4 , the e¤ect of microeconomic drivers are limited on the aggregate. This is because their e¤ect on the amplitude of variations in low-skilled emigration rates is rather small (+1.0 percentage point when income increases from $1,000 to $4,000), while their in ‡uence is also dominated by the changing skill composition of the population, as discussed in the previous section.
Modeling implications
Finally, in order to shed light on the microfoundations of migration decisions, we take our migration accounting methodology one step further and investigate the skill-speci…c e¤ect of development on migration aspirations and realization rates. We simulate counterfactual levels of potential migration and realization rates, p s X;i and r s X;i , for each group of workers (s = h; l) for each country i. As before, we use the signi…cant estimates of the parsimonious regressions. We then estimate the nonparametric trends, p s X (y) and r s X (y), using the Epanechnikov kernel method with a bandwidth of 0.5 before …nally comparing them with the trends computed using observed values, p s (y) and r s (y). Figure 6 depicts the marginal e¤ect of economic development on aspirations and realization rates, s p;X (y) and s r;X (y). Turning …rst to the highly skilled -and bearing in mind Figures 2.c and 2.d that reveal that both migration aspirations and realization rates of college-educated individuals decrease with development - Figure 6 .a shows that changes in average aspirations are mostly due to the in ‡uence of the share of the population aged 15 to 24 (in line with Table 1 ). Networks have a limited impact at the margin, while gravity drivers tend to increase aspirations for countries above $1,500 per capita. Decreases in distance stimulate aspirations, as shown by the gravity curve. Importantly, microeconomic drivers have no signi…cant impact on the aspirations of college graduates. This result is compatible with a micro-founded model of relative deprivation, according to which aspirations are based on the relative position of an individual in a particular social hierarchy, as opposed to the absolute level of an individual's income (as in Stark, 1989 and 1991) . Conversely, Figure 5 .b shows that the negative e¤ect of development on realization rates is mainly due to microeconomic drivers (the income channel). When income increases, the realization rate of the highly skilled decreases, an e¤ect which is partially compensated by the inequality channel. Realization rates are clearly endogenous and decrease with the level of development at origin. This might be due to the fact that the opportunity costs of preparing a migration spell increase with development. For countries with incomes per capita below $10,000, this e¤ect is reinforced by both the gravity channel.
Fig 6. Marginal e¤ect of development on aspirations and realization rates
As far as the less educated are concerned, Figure 2 .c and 2.d reveal that migration aspirations slightly decrease with development, while realization rates exhibit an inverted-U shaped relationship with a peak at $6,000 of income per capita. Figure 6 .c shows that the e¤ect of development on aspirations is driven by the income channel. Contrary to the case of college graduates, the willingness of the less educated to migrate decreases with income. Gravity and network drivers attenuate these e¤ects, especially in countries where income per capital is lower than $5,000. With regards realization rates, an increase in development stimulates emigration through the gravity, network and socio-demographic channels at low levels of development. The income channel has an ambiguous e¤ect on realization rates. Increasing income stimulates realization rates below $1,600 (re ‡ecting lower migration constraints). Above $1,600 however, realization rates decrease with income as for the college educated. The negative e¤ect of income becomes dominant when income per capita exceeds $6,000.
These …ndings have implications for the modeling of migration decisions. They suggest that both aspiration and realization rates result from cost-bene…t analyses. At the margin, an increase in development reduces the willingness to emigrate through the income channel (at least for the less educated). In particular, the Gallup data on aspirations (or willingness to emigrate) show that while income disparities and migration costs matter for the low skilled, they exert no signi…cant in ‡uence on high skilled individuals. A model of relative deprivation is compatible with these patterns. Realization rates decrease with income at intermediate and high levels of development, especially for the highly skilled. For the less educated an increase in income stimulates realization rates during early stages of development. This …nding is compatible with the existence of endogenous migration constraints. Realization rates are clearly not exogenously determined by the legal restrictions imposed by the destination countries. These results are compatible with a two-step model of migration decisions. Aspiration data capture the perceived psychic costs and bene…ts of emigration of crossing borders. Realization data are suggestive of a decision model wherein the probability of success decreases with the development level of the origin country. This may re ‡ect the fact that the time (or opportunity) cost of preparing for migration (and obtaining a visa) is valued at the market wage of the origin country.
Conclusion
Zelinsky (1971) in his seminal paper, was the …rst to hypothesize an inverted-U shape between migration and development, a relationship that he termed the mobility transition, which has subsequently been observed in a variety of settings. Neo-classical explanations have been unable to explain the upward segment of the curve whereby migration increases with development at origin for countries with low or middling incomes per capita. The existence of this section of the curve has therefore constituted a decades-old puzzle for which several potential explanations have been pro¤ered in numerous geographical and historical contexts.
In this paper we analyze rich aggregated micro-data on individual's aspirations and realization rates in a uni…ed multi-country, migration accounting setting to address this apparent enigma. Having con…rmed the existence of the mobility transition non-parametrically, we subsequently use regression analysis to run a horse race between all competing theories underpinning the observed relationship for the …rst time. Having identi…ed statistically sig-ni…cant variables from this analysis, we simulate counterfactual emigration rates to quantify the relative contributions of each potential driver of the mobility transition. Our counterfactual emigration rates are those obtained when one of our explanatory variables is set to the average level prevailing across rich countries, from which we estimate non-parametric trends, which in turn are compared to actual emigration rates.
Our key result is that whereas the contributions of what we term microeconomic drivers (i.e. income and inequality e¤ects) are limited, accounting for only 25% of slope of the increasing segment of the mobility transition curve in the poorest countries and less than 20% in lower-middle income countries; our analysis clearly demonstrates that a fraction ranging between one-third and one-half of rises in emigration from developing countries are rather driven by the changing skill composition of the working-age population. While our conclusion is somewhat at odds with many pre-existing explanations, it is rather intuitive. Emigration increases with development, because the proportion of college graduates in the native population increases and it is precisely this group that has highest propensity to emigrate abroad.
